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THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL DIVINE CAUSATION AND
THE BENEFITS OF PARTIAL CAUSATION: A RESPONSE
TO SKOGHOLT
by Mikael Leidenhag
Abstract. In this article, I defend my previous argument that nat-
ural divine causation suffers under the problem of causal overdeter-
mination and that it cannot serve as a line of demarcation between
theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). I do this in light
of Christoffer Skogholt’s critique of my article. I argue that Skogholt
underestimates the naturalistic ambitions of some current thinkers in
TE and fails, therefore, to adequately respond to my main argument.
I also outline how partial causation better serves as a model for the
relationship between God’s providence and evolution.
Keywords: causality; intelligent design; overdetermination;
panentheism; theistic evolution; theistic naturalism
In my article on the blurred relationship between theistic evolution (TE)
and intelligent design (ID), I made a collection of arguments toward the
conclusion that an increasingly popular naturalistic formulation of TE fails
to demarcate itself from ID (Leidenhag 2019). It has become popular for
theistic evolutionists to propose that God only works through and within
natural processes, and to contrast this account of God’s action in evolution
with the interventionist deity of ID. While the idea that God only works
through and within natural processes comes in many forms, and is for-
mulated against the background of a variety of metaphysical frameworks,
I gave this theory of divine action the summarizing title, Natural Divine
Causation (NDC). On NDC, God acts in a noninterventionist manner, in
harmony with natural laws, and in congruency with the natural processes
of the cosmos. For those who support the notion of NDC, which includes
a number of prominent figures in the science-religion dialogue, this view
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of God’s providence provides a way beyond the interventionist picture of
ID, whereby God occasionally breaks or suspends the laws of nature. As
opposed to the “gappy” God of ID, NDC strives to uphold a compatibilist
picture of the relationship between divine activity and natural processes.
What is most important to the argument of my previous article is that
those who support NDC suggest that such a model of divine action pro-
vides a line of demarcation between TE and ID. I located several causal
problems facing NDC, particularly regarding causal overdetermination,
and suggested that it consequently fails as a line of demarcation between
TE and ID. When drawn with the pen of NDC, the line between TE and
ID becomes blurred. And, when the line of demarcation between these
theories is blurred, then the idea of TE and ID as competing alternatives
dissolves into a falsely polemical image.
I would like to thank Christoffer Skogholt for his engaging and
thought-provoking response. In his response, Skogholt argues that my cri-
tique of an NDC accommodation of TE fails to hit its target. More specif-
ically, Skogholt opposes my main argument, namely, that NDC seem-
ingly makes God-talk ontologically redundant. Before I go on to defend
my overall argument, it is worth clearing up a major confusion that has
emerged in Skogholt’s article. I am not claiming that TE as such makes di-
vine action redundant. That is, I am not opposed to TE. Rather, I take is-
sue with those scholars who construe TE, and divine action more broadly,
in a naturalistic manner, as exemplified by NDC. Given this confusion,
Skogholt’s response fails, unfortunately, to engage properly with my article.
I will, first, defend my previous argument that NDC makes God-talk
redundant. Second, I will highlight the promise of partial causation for
framing an adequate version of TE, thus clearing up a major confusion
that has emerged in Skogholt’s response. Finally, I will briefly consider
Skogholt’s discussion of the problem of evil. It will be seen that NDC
faces its own share of theological and philosophical challenges in light of
the reality of natural evil in evolution.
Defending the Redundancy Argument
My main argument is that the model of NDC is a theologically and
philosophically costly strategy for framing God’s actions in the world.
As Skogholt seems to think that no scholar adopts NDC (if only this
were true!), it is worth rehearsing what NDC means for our understand-
ing of divine action, and how it impacts the science-religion discussion
more broadly. It is, in fact, rather surprising that Skogholt engaged so lit-
tle with the model of NDC, and even more surprising that he opens his
article with a brief outline of Aquinas’s distinction between primary and
secondary causation, which, while theologically and philosophically inter-
esting, bears little resemblance to NDC. It would be a serious mistake to
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equate Aquinas’s notion of divine providence with the theistic naturalism
and panentheistic models of Clayton, Peacocke, Griffin, and Johnston.
In fact, Peacocke and Griffin have both critiqued a Thomistic distinction
between primary and secondary causality, as well as the model of double-
agency, for employing a dualistic ontology and for ultimately entailing a
supernaturalistic interruption of natural laws (see Peacocke 1993, 148–49;
Griffin 2000, 38–40; Griffin 2004, 8).
Once again, my argument is not aimed at theistic evolution as such,
and so I have no immediate objection to the sort of distinction between
primary and secondary causation that we find in many versions of theistic
evolution. Aquinas’s theology and NDC paint very different pictures of
God’s ongoing activity in the world, and Skogholt’s response fails to en-
gage with much of my argument due to this conflation of Thomism and
NDC. Why start off with a Thomistic account of divine action when this
account is so different from the naturalistic ambitions of Clayton, Pea-
cocke, Griffin, and Johnston?1
Those who adopt NDC—which includes Philip Clayton, Arthur Pea-
cocke, David Ray Griffin, Mark Johnston, and to some extent Deborah
Haarsma—suggest that the divine action debate and our views of God’s
interaction with evolutionary forces need to proceed on a “presumption
of naturalism” (Clayton 1997, 171; Leidenhag 2019, 926). This presump-
tion states that “for any event in the natural order … its cause is a natural
one as opposed to a supernatural one.” In a similar vein, Arthur Peacocke
argues quite strongly that the “only dualism which such a [naturalistic]
stance accepts is indeed that between God and all-that-is, the ‘world’; it
rejects any dualisms within the natural order itself, including humanity”
(Peacocke 2007, 9). In Griffin’s terminology, this amounts to a “minimal
naturalism,” which means that “the world’s most fundamental causal prin-
ciples are never interrupted” (Griffin 2000, 44). For Griffin, this consti-
tutes the “most fundamental assumption of the contemporary scientific
worldview” (Griffin 2000, 12). Griffin grounds this claim in the process
theological rejection of creatio ex nihilo. This, according to Griffin, post-
biblical doctrine has not merely caused a dualistic and antagonistic rela-
tionship between God and creation, but renders, furthermore, the prob-
lem of evil acute (I will return to this claim toward the end of the article).
According to Griffin, creatio ex nihilo distorts the Christian tradition and
puts key Christian claims regarding divine agency in opposition to a sci-
entific worldview. Rather than grounding our view of creation in creatio ex
nihilo, we need to frame it in accordance with a minimal naturalism that
respects the integrity of the natural world.
Although Mark Johnston launches his contribution from a somewhat
different metaphysical angle, he suggests similarly that a main task for to-
day’s theologians is to formulate a model for divine action that “is in no
way at odds with the form of the natural realm disclosed by science: that is,
Mikael Leidenhag 699
a causal realm closed under natural law” (Johnston 2009, 119–20). This
is, contrary to a materialistic and scientistic version of naturalism, a “le-
gitimate naturalism” that “arises out of the proper respect for the methods
and achievements of science” (Johnston 2009, 43). DeborahHaarsma does
not explicitly endorse a naturalistic starting point for theological consider-
ations of divine providence. Nevertheless, her account raises issues regard-
ing causal compatibilism between divine action and natural processes in
the way that she stresses that we can “perceive design in nature even when
scientists have a complete natural explanation” (Haarsma 2017, 222).2
Hence, these scholars are united in seeking to explicate a model of divine
action that can bring together two key claims:
(1) God acts in the natural domain.
(2) All events within the natural domain are (a) consistent with natu-
ral law and (b) causally reconstructible in terms of natural causation
(Clayton 2004, 163).
The second claim leads, of course, to significant methodological and on-
tological restrictions for how we can imagine God’s active involvement in
the world. What they propose is, therefore, a form of theological compat-
ibilism, which suggests that one can maintain a nondualist and noninter-
ventionist view of divine action. God acts, but in a natural mode. My over-
all claim is that this model is fallacious and renders divine action ontologi-
cally meaningless. Skogholt, however, seems to think that these scholars are
proposing a slightly weaker thesis, claiming that they are only naturalistic
in the sense that God acts in a noninterventionist manner, and so they do
not deny God’s influence altogether (Skogholt 2020, 690). Proponents of
NDC may like to argue for something closer to what Skogholt attributes
to them. However, my main point is that they are unable to do so because
they cannot uphold a sufficiently robust notion of divine influence.
Unfortunately, their commitment to a nondualistic relationship be-
tween divine causation and natural causation makes God’s actions causally
redundant. The naturalistic assumptions that underpin NDC means that
when natural causes have been fully accounted for there is no causal work
for God to do. This is why I take the main challenge for NDC to be a
causal one; namely, the causal problem of overdetermination.
Skogholt seemingly thinks that my concern with NDC is that it makes
divine action scientifically obsolete, in that God cannot enter into scientific
practice and explanations. As he writes: “since God is scientifically redun-
dant, God is, Leidenhag apparently thinks, made redundant tout court”
(Skogholt 2020, 687). This is an unfortunate mischaracterization of my
argument, but it helps to highlight the difference between my core argu-
ment and the concerns of ID theorists who argue for the inclusion of their
theory in science curriculums. ID theorists fault theistic evolutionists for
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making divine action redundant in the sense that God is pushed out of
scientific explanations. Since I do not think that God’s actions can be ver-
ified by methods of natural science, I do not share this concern. Although
my previous article focused on a critique of a particular account of di-
vine action popular among some recent proponents of theistic evolution,
it should not be taken as a positive argument for ID, which has significant
problems and shortcomings of its own.
By drawing on Jaegwon Kim’s influential work on issues of causal ex-
clusion (Kim 1993, 1998, 2005, 2006), I made the argument that NDC,
by negating any ontological difference between divine action and natural
processes, is vulnerable to the criticism that it makes divine action causally
redundant.
Let us look at Skogholt’s discussion of Kim’s argument as it pertains to
divine action, to see if my argument still stands. His main point is that
my critique does not hold water as “no theist could possibly claim that
God’s actions are ontologically secondary to natural processes, as men-
tal phenomena are to physical phenomena in non-reductive physicalism”
(Skogholt 2020, 693). Skogholt thinks that no theist could hold to such a
view, and I certainly agree that no theist should hold such a view. Skogholt
is spot on with his concern that the prioritization of natural processes over
divine activity is an unsustainable and undesirable position for any theist
to affirm. This is exactly what the NDC position amounts to by framing
divine activity in accordance with the stated “presumption of naturalism,”
namely, that all divine acts within nature have to be reframed in naturalis-
tic and scientific language.
For these naturalistically inclined thinkers, God’s actions in the world
need to be mediated by natural processes, as no dualism is allowed within
physical reality. This is what Clayton maintains when he makes the
broader assertion that there is “no qualitative or ontological difference be-
tween the regularity of natural law as expressing the regular or repetitive
operation of divine agency and the intentionality of special divine actions”
(Clayton 2004, 84). This means, following Johnston’s legitimate natural-
ism, that God’s “activity is manifest in and through natural processes alone”
(Johnston 2009, 119). There is, as Peacocke says, “no need to look for
God as some kind of additional factor supplementing the processes of the
world” (Peacocke 2001, 474).
Hence, what these thinkers suggest is that there is a degree of super-
venience, that is, ontological dependency, between divine causation and
natural processes, such that divine acts need to be mediated by the natural
regularities of the world. Although Skogholt thinks that no theist adheres
to such an articulation of supervenience, this is in effect what a natural-
istic construal of divine agency comes down to, which follows from the
presumption of naturalism. The question, then, is not if these theists es-
pouse supervenience, but whether such a construal is theologically and
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philosophically successful. Given that Skogholt simply claims that no the-
ist adopts such a view, he never engages with my argument on this issue.
Moreover, while Skogholt addresses the issue of supervenience, he
avoids or fails to address the main point in my engagement with Kim’s
work on causality and explanation, namely, that the NDC account of the-
istic evolution makes divine action causally redundant. The compatibilist
picture of NDC entails that for any event in the natural order, this event
can be given an entirely natural explanation in terms of the categories of
the sciences. There are no gaps in nature, as the theistic naturalists often
want to remind us of. However, such a view makes it exceedingly diffi-
cult to give any causal relevance to divine action in nature. God’s action
cannot be construed as an “additional influence” (Peacocke) in the world
since the world’s “causal principles are never interrupted” (Griffin), and
all events have natural causes as opposed to supernatural causes (Clayton).
Without having to repeat my main argument, I drew on Kim’s discussion
of causal overdetermination to show that this naturalistic articulation of
God’s relationship to the workings of the world renders the very notion
of divine action causally superfluous. Divine action becomes an unnec-
essary metaphysical add-on to an already complete natural view of the
world. In what way does God add anything to event e if the cause of e
is entirely natural? This dilemma is the Achilles’ heel of the NDC ap-
proach to theistic evolution. However, Skogholt’s main counterargument
against this critique, if I interpret him correctly, is that since God cre-
ated and sustains the natural order, God is always causally involved in its
development, and hence far from redundant. He references, in relation
to this point, Peacocke’s affirmation that “God continuously gives them
[natural processes] existence” (Skogholt 2020, 689), and that God as “the
creative source of all that is” brought “into existence a cosmos with fecund
possibilities” (Skogholt 2020, 689). Although this clearly speaks to God’s
continuous sustaining action of the cosmos, it does not address how God’s
“special actions,” or special providence, are possible under these natural-
istic constraints. It is special divine actions that are under consideration
in the debate between TE and ID, because both camps claim a superior
account of God’s guidance, influence, and providence in conjunction with
evolution. The affirmation that God created a world in the first place, or
that God sustains creation, is not the issue at hand.
One might get the impression that these theistic naturalists, when read-
ing Skogholt’s article, are content with God’s general sustaining activity,
but this is far from true.3 These NDC proponents suggest that God can act
in particular and decisive ways in the world. Hence, Peacocke, for example,
emphasizes frequently the theological necessity of special divine action,
that “God could bring about the occurrence of particular events and pat-
terns of events—those which express God’s intentions. These would then
be the result of ‘special, divine action’, as distinct from the divine holding
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in existence of all-that-is, and so would not otherwise have happened had
God not so intended” (Peacocke 2006, 274). Likewise, Clayton’s counter
factual principle (Leidenhag 2019, 921–22) suggests that “had God not
acted in helping to produce some effect, the effect would not have been
identical to the state of affairs we in fact observe” (Clayton 2008, 104).
Indeed, Clayton stresses that God acts in the minds of believers in a rev-
elatory mode, and that God communicates directly with people in ways
that are not fully capturable in scientific discourse. This is, according to
Clayton, the level on which the “divine lure” operates (Clayton and Knapp
2011, 58). On the process theological perspective of Griffin, the divine
reality acts in specific manners by “persuading” natural entities. This is
“God’s providential activity in us” which “is also the ultimate source of
our moral and aesthetic ideals” (Griffin 2000, 97). These scholars stress
God’s more direct actions in order to pre-empt the accusation that their
proposals collapse into sheer deism (see regarding the problem of deism in
their accounts of divine action: Clayton 1997, 192, 208; Griffin 2000, 28,
64, 261; Griffin 2004, 30; Johnston 2009, 50).
Mymain argument is that these scholars cannot successfully square their
adherence to the presumption of naturalism with the view that God acts
in specific ways in the natural order, without this producing Kim’s causal
overdetermination problem. If these scholars suggest that events within
the natural order can be sufficiently explained through natural processes
alone, then this leaves no causal room for God’s special providence. This
is, as I explain in my article, the problem of positing multiple, sufficient
explanandum for one single event, e (Leidenhag 2019, 916–18). NDC is
positing more causes than necessary for event, e, hence, this model en-
counters what Kim calls causal overdetermination. If one holds, as sug-
gested by NDC, that e can be sufficiently explained in terms of some
natural process, then God’s providence is not adding anything causal to
the picture. Skogholt never mentioned the problem of overdetermination
and has done nothing to make me question this central argument. In-
deed, his incredulity that any theist could propose something as bizarre
as NDC and his desire to downplay the naturalistic dimension of pro-
posals by Peacocke, Clayton, Griffin, and Johnston is encouraging to me.
This misunderstanding arises largely from Skogholt’s apparent equation
between Aquinas’s theology of divine action, which is not the focus of my
critique, and NDC. As Skogholt never engages with the problem of causal
overdetermination for NDC, my argument still stands.
Theistic Evolution, ID, and Partial Causation
Skogholt’s response indicates that I take all forms of theistic evolution to be
problematic. This is not true, and in my article I offer a constructive route
toward a more viable form of theistic evolution through the idea of partial
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causation (Leidenhag 2019, 918–20). Partial causation allows for God and
natural processes to jointly produce certain events in the natural order. My
discussion of this is, however, strangely absent in Skogholt’s response.
Let me briefly recap this view of causality and its implications for the-
istic evolution. Partial causation starts off from the intuitive idea that we
need to appeal to a variety of causes in order to explain some event, oc-
currence, property, object, and so on. I used Kim’s example of an auto-
mobile accident, and noted that we might need to appeal to more than
one factor—perhaps an icy road, congested traffic, alcohol intoxication,
and so on—to explain why there was an accident (Leidenhag 2019, 918–
19). The upshot of this view of causality is that it avoids the problem of
overdetermination as it does not posit several complete explanations for one
single event. Applied on the issue of God’s providence in nature, this view
suggests that divine causality and natural causation might be “relevant to
different aspects, properties, or features of the explanandum; hence, there
is no epistemic competition,” and no issue of overdetermination (Leiden-
hag 2019, 919). I, therefore, suggested in my article that “partial causation
is the best way to frame the theological and philosophical claims of” the-
istic evolution (Leidenhag 2019, 920). Once again, it surprises me that
Skogholt seemingly ignored this discussion. Through the idea of partial
causation, I seek to indicate an alternative route for framing the relation-
ship between God and evolution. I would have appreciated Skogholt’s re-
sponse to this discussion.
Perhaps Skogholt assumes that framing divine action in this way entails
ID, and that partial causation, therefore, is intrinsically incompatible with
any meaningful formulation of theistic evolution? Indeed, I suggested that
such a view of theistic evolution would pull it “closer to the antinaturalistic
assertions of ID” (Leidenhag 2019, 919). Let me add some assuring words:
partial causation does not necessarily entail ID as such, and adopting this
view of causation does not mean that one needs to adopt the central claims
of the ID community. First of all, a core claim within ID is that the divine
presence in creation, in natural processes, and in organisms, is scientifically
detectible. This is a claim that I take issue with.
When viewed from the perspective of faith or from within theology,
various features of the natural world as described by science corroborate
theological claims and indicate God’s existence. However, I do not think
(as ID proponents do) that we can infer such theological claims directly
from scientific findings or observations. Divine design, or guidance, is nei-
ther scientifically verifiable nor falsifiable. Moreover, ID aims to propose
a research programme on the basis of design. I doubt the success of this
proposal, given the general agnostic attitude that many ID theorists take
with regard to the identity of the Designer (see Leidenhag 2019, 928,
footnote 1).
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It should be noted that an NDC formulation of theistic evolution sub-
scribes, ironically, to a similar methodological assumption of ID, namely,
that the issue of divine design is something that needs corroboration
through science. For the NDC proponent, this means that divine action
needs to be articulated in a naturalistically acceptable manner and through
scientific categories and theories. For ID proponents, it means that divine
action is scientifically verifiable. These groups proceed on seemingly shared
assumptions regarding how theology can and should be related to the
sciences.
The task of articulating divine providence is a theological one, and not a
scientific one. It is primarily a theological matter for which science can be
relevant and helpful, but which needs no scientific validation. This sets my
view apart from both NDC and ID. In fact, I agree with those who have
argued critically that such tendencies to subjugate theology to the natural
sciences reveal a tacit commitment to scientism (see, e.g., Taede Smedes’s
2004 critical treatment of the divine action projects of John Polkinghorne
and Arthur Peacocke).
To conclude this section, I suggest that a successful account of theistic
evolution needs to be articulated along the lines of partial causation, which
safeguards the irreducibility of divine causation. I would have appreciated
Skogholt’s input on this issue, and so I am disappointed to see that his
response did not engage with my proposal.
Is NDC Better Suited to Respond to the Problem of Evil?
Another rather perplexing feature of Skogholt’s response is when he states
that a second core argument of my article is that “if theistic evolution
escapes the redundancy-objection it is so vulnerable to the problem of
natural evil” (Skogholt 2020, 686). Worth noting again is that my arti-
cle does not critique theistic evolution per se, merely a naturalistic con-
strual of it as exemplified by Peacocke, Clayton, Griffin, Johnston, and
to some extent Haarsma. Because of this misunderstanding, a large part
of Skogholt’s discussion is irrelevant to my overall argument. He men-
tions several sophisticated responses—Christopher Southgate’s, Bethany
Sollereder’s, John Polkinghorne’s—to the problem of evil and suffering in
an evolutionary world, yet none of these scholars adopt an NDC account
of theistic evolution. Indeed, I find myself largely agreeing with such re-
sponses. The problem, here, once again is that Skogholt mistakenly thinks
that my argument against a naturalistic construal of theistic evolution con-
stitutes an argument for ID. This becomes clear when he suggests that the
problem of evil is a problem for all theists, including those theists who
affirm ID. He writes, “One can argue that the philosophical-theological
framework of ID is actually less well suited for handling the existence of
natural evil” (Skogholt 2020, 692). I agree fully with Skogholt’s remark
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on this point, and it should be noted here that I stated in my article that
I find “the claims of ID theologically thorny, philosophically dubious, and
scientifically problematic” (Leidenhag 2019, 910). It could very well be
the case that ID is particularly ill-equipped for dealing with the problem
of evil.
Putting these misinterpretations aside, I am glad that Skogholt empha-
sizes the issue of natural evil as I believe that such a feature of the natural
world poses significant challenges to a naturalistic accommodation of the-
istic evolution and divine action in general. In fact, the NDC proponents
under consideration present the problem of evil as a case for naturalizing
God’s active presence in nature. Clayton, Griffin, and Peacocke link the
problem of evil to an interventionist depiction of God. Clayton writes, “If
one offers a ‘rich’ account of divine action, according to which God is fre-
quently altering states of affairs, then one must also be prepared to provide
an account of why he does not act at other times” (Clayton 1997, 11).
Griffin offers a similar concern when he suggests that the intervention-
ism of a supernaturalist depiction of God is “contradicted by the world’s
evil,” such as the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 (Griffin 2000, 27). The prob-
lem of supernaturalism, according to Griffin, is that “any evil in the world
could have been prevented by God” (Griffin 2000, 28). Peacocke affirms
a similar conclusion about the theological deficit of interventionism: “In
the classical perception of God as transcendent and as existing in a space
distinct from that of the world, there is an implied detachment from the
world in its suffering. This renders the problem of evil particularly acute.
For God can only do anything about evil by an intervention from the out-
side, which provokes the classical dilemma of either God can and will not,
or he would but cannot” (Peacocke 2004, 105).
A traditional view of God, whereby God can perform miracles above
and beyond natural regularities and laws, faces certainly a number of the-
ological and philosophical challenges in light of the reality of evil. Why
God permits evil remains a mystery and a problem. The severity of this
problem should not be underestimated or lightly dismissed. However, the
relevant question here is whether NDC offers any advantages to the tra-
ditional (“interventionist”) picture. If it did, then despite the problems of
overdetermination outlined above, this would be a substantial reason to
seriously consider NDC. However, NDC offers no advantages over tradi-
tional, nonnaturalistic accounts of divine action with regard to the prob-
lem of evil. Indeed, NDC has its own set of challenges in accounting for
the existence of natural evil. While traditional models struggle to account
for God’s inaction with regard to the permission of evil, NDC struggles
to avoid the more severe conclusion that God’s action participates in nat-
ural evil and that God may ultimately be unable to defeat the evils of this
world. I will list some concerns about this below.
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The Problem of Equating Divine Action with Natural Processes
Clayton expresses clearly that there is no qualitative or ontological differ-
ence between divine action, D, and natural processes, N (Clayton 2004,
84). Peacocke suggests similarly that natural processes are “in themselves
God-acting-as-Creator” (Peacocke 2001, 474). In some way D = N. Yet,
if this ontological relationship is true, then it raises the problematic con-
sequence of God being causally responsible for natural evils. That is, if
God’s action is equivalent to N and N entails some natural evil, then
God is in some way responsible for such evil. The waste, destruction, and
mass suffering that is part of evolution would merely express the activity
of God. Of course, these theistic naturalists might object and say that God
is more present in certain natural processes than others, but I fail to see
how this qualification could be made compatible with Clayton’s sugges-
tion that there is no ontological and qualitative difference between D and
N. If God is more present or causally active in N1 compared to N2, then
surely there has to be some ontological difference between God’s general
activity and how God engages with particular processes. Yet, if this is true,
then it remains unclear how this could be made consistent with NDC.
Griffin on Metaphysical Necessity of Evil
As described above, Griffin’s NDC proceeds from a different starting point
to Clayton and Peacocke, in the way that he rejects creatio ex nihilo for the
reason that it gives rise to the problems associated with supernaturalism.
For Griffin, creation is necessarily constitutive of God’s being. However,
this leads to the theological conclusion that if evil is part of creation, and
creation exists necessarily in God, then evil is also a necessary constitutive
feature of God’s being. Hence, this process theological view might strug-
gle to uphold a view of God as perfectly good considering the possible
metaphysical implications of the reality of evil.
Griffin on Eschatological Hope
On Griffin’s view, creation offers resistance to the divine will in virtue of
its inherent powers (Griffin 2004, 38). This is to avoid the supernatural-
ist conclusion that God can violate even those causal principles that are
so fundamental that they seem to belong to the very fabric of existence
(Griffin 2000, 44). However, as Kenneth Pak has convincingly argued,
process theology might not be able to assure us that good will prevail over
evil (Pak 2014). Remember that on this view God can persuade beings
to pursue the divine goal, but is unable to unilaterally control them. God
cannot override the autonomy of natural organisms. As Pak goes on to
argue, if God’s power is limited in this sort of way given creation’s intrin-
sic powers, then it is unclear to what extent an eschatological victory can
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be assured on this metaphysical perspective (Pak 2014, 222–28). In fact,
Griffin concedes this consequence, saying that there is no “assurance that
any particular evil, including the evil of the imminent self-destruction of
the human race, can be ruled out. God persuades against it, but there is
no guarantee that we will give heed” (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 118).
To emphasize, these critical suggestions are not defeaters or conclusive
arguments. They merely illustrate the larger point that an NDC account,
all things considered, does not necessarily fare better in light of evil in an
evolutionary world.
Conclusions
This article has defended my previous argument regarding the causal prob-
lems of NDC in light of Skogholt’s response, and how it leads to a blurred
line between theistic evolution and ID. As Skogholt, unfortunately, under-
estimates the naturalistic ambitions of Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke,
David Ray Griffin, and Mark Johnston, his response to my critique fails in
many ways to hit its target. This is clear in the way that he uses Aquinas’s
theology as an interpretive lens for all accounts of theistic evolution. How-
ever, Aquinas proposes a significantly different metaphysical picture of di-
vine causation in the world compared to those who affirm NDC. Given
this confusion, I devoted the first part of my article to defending the
very idea that these scholars seek to make divine action naturalistically
acceptable.
Given that Skogholt indicates that I take all forms of theistic evolution
to be intrinsically problematic, I recapitulated and defended the claim in
my previous article that partial causation delivers a promising route for
theistic evolution. As I remarked above, I find it surprising that Skogholt
never engaged with my discussion on this, given that it could better frame
God’s activity in evolution. Toward the end of this article, I briefly high-
lighted the ways in which the problem of evil comes to the surface within
an NDC account of theistic evolution, and that NDC does not necessar-
ily fare better than traditional theism in light of natural evils in an evolu-
tionary world. To conclude, I do not think that Skogholt has successfully
undermined my argument that a naturalistic accommodation of theistic
evolution is vulnerable to the problem of causal overdetermination.
Notes
1. In my article, I evaluate if naturalistic divine causation could be construed as a “Natural-
istically Tinged Thomism,” but I concluded that a Thomistic differentiation between primary
and secondary causation is ultimately unacceptable to NDC given an underlying dualism. Pea-
cocke and Griffin would agree with this conclusion. See Leidenhag (2019, 923–24).
2. Although Haarsma, as I noted in my previous paper, affirms God’s miraculous actions
in the life of Jesus Christ, her way of joining together complete natural explanations of event e
with a theological explanation of e, still raises the concern of causal overdetermination.
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3. Skogholt takes issue with my understanding of Howard van Till. He writes: “Peacocke
then goes on to approvingly quote Howard van Till, who Leidenhag considers as presenting a
contrasting view of theistic evolution to Peacocke, but with which Peacocke agrees.” Here, we
can see clearly how Skogholt confuses two issues. It is true that Peacocke agrees with Van Till
on the view that creation possesses intrinsic potentialities. However, Peacocke goes beyond Van
Till’s theological account when he suggests the need for maintaining a robust account of God’s
special providence. Van Till, in contrast, is content with locating God’s action in the formative
stages of creation. It is clear from his reading of my paper that Skogholt fails to see that my
critical evaluation of NDC takes issue with the ambition of fusing special divine action with
naturalism.
References
Clayton, Philip. 1997. God and Contemporary Science. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University
Press.
———. 2004. Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
———. 2008. “Towards a Theory of Divine Action that Has Traction.” In Scientific Perspectives
on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, edited by Robert John Russell,
Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, 85–110. Vatican City State: Vatican Observa-
tory; Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences.
Clayton, Philip, and Steven Knapp. 2011. The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy, Faith.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Cobb, John, and David Ray Griffin. 1976. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition.
Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
Griffin, David Ray. 2000. Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
———. 2004. Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith.
Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
Haarsma, Deborah B. 2017. “Response from Evolutionary Creation.” In Four Views on Creation,
Evolution, and Intelligent Design, edited by Ken Ham, Hugh Ross, Deborah B. Haarsma,
and Stephen C. Meyer, 221–26. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
Johnston, Mark. 2009. Saving God: Religion after Idolatry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Kim, Jaegwon. 1993. Supervenience andMind: Selected Philosophical Essays. New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press.
———. 1998. Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
———. 2006. “Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues.” Synthese 151: 547–59.
Leidenhag, Mikael. 2019. “The Blurred Line between Theistic Evolution and Intelligent De-
sign.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 54: 909–31.
Pak, Kenneth K. 2014. “Could Process Theodicy Uphold the Generic Idea of God?” American
Journal of Theology and Philosophy 35: 211–28.
Peacocke, Arthur. 1993. Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine, and
Human. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
———. 2001. “Welcoming the ‘Disguised’ Friend—Darwinism and Divinity.” In Intelligent
Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives,
edited by Robert T. Pennock, 471–86. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2004. Evolution: The Disguised Friend of Faith? West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton
Foundation Press.
———. 2006. “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Re-
lation to the Human Mind-Brain-Body.” In The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emer-
gentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Philip Clayton and Paul Davies,
257–278. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
———. 2007. “Naturalism, Theism, and Religion.” In All That Is: A Naturalistic Faith for the
Twenty-First Century, edited by Philip Clayton, 5–11. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Mikael Leidenhag 709
Skogholt, Christoffer. 2020. “I Walk the Line: Comment on Mikael Leidenhag on Theistic
Evolution and Intelligent Design.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 55: 685–95.
Smedes, Taede. 2004. Chaos, Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism. Leuven: Peeters
Publishers.
